How the new Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 does not allow ordination of non-celibate gays and lesbians

How it is that the new Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 does not allow ordination of non-celibate gays and lesbians

Written by Edward Koster
Tuesday, 08 July 2008 13:31

The initial reactions to the Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 approved by the General Assembly in San Jose were dramatic. Some were rejoicing, others despairing, because they believed that the General Assembly, in approving the overture submitted by the John Knox Presbytery, had removed the impediment to the ordination of non-celibate gays and lesbians that had been declared by the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission in the case Bush v. Presbytery of Pittsburgh.

This new AI would overturn the Bush decision and bring immediate relief from the prohibition from ordaining non-celibate gays and lesbians by allowing governing bodies to declare the fidelity and chastity provision of G-6.0106b not essential to the Reformed faith and practice.
I include myself among those who initially interpreted it in that way. I concluded that because I was recalling the wording of the John Knox overture, which called for an Authoritative Interpretation that cancelled the GAPJC holding on Bush. Under our ordinary rules of authoritative interpretations, the most recent AI prevails, and the San Jose AI would effectively cancel the Birmingham AI. The General Assembly, however, did not cancel out the Birmingham AI: It affirmed it.

The Bush case was an appeal of the decision of Pittsburgh Presbytery to declare a set of standards that could not be waived. The Synod of the Trinity PJC held that a governing body could not do that, for each case must be considered individually. Then it went one step further: It declared that the fidelity and chastity provision of G-6.0106b could not be waived, and the General Assembly PJC affirmed.

The effect of Bush was to shut down any hope that the Birmingham AI would allow an ordaining body to ordain a candidate who declared he or she will not comply with the fidelity and chastity provision of G-6.0106b. It did so by declaring that this “standard” of ordination was excluded from the historic principle that governing bodies have sole discretion in determining whether candidates hold to the essentials of reformed faith and practice. This is distinct from the principle that a governing body may not itself violate the Constitution.

The paradox of the Bush case was that on the one hand a presbytery could not declare a set of non-waivable standards, while at the same time it declared a non-waivable standard. This contradiction gave persuasive weight to the John Knox overture.

But when the GA amended the John Knox overture to affirm the Birmingham AI, it kept the requirement that a judicial commission may not allow an ordaining body to violate the Constitution. If a governing body ordains or installs a person who refuses to comply with something the Confessions call sin, it would be in violation of G-6.0106b.

The San Jose AI leaves us in a rather complex position constitutionally, for we now have two authoritative interpretations of the same provision of the Book of Order. The Birmingham AI requires that a presbytery or session comply with the Constitution when it ordains, while the intent of the San Jose AI is to allow ordination and installation of those who declare they will not comply with provisions of G-6.0106b.

We are in a pickle.

Believe it or not, it is common for laws and rules to be in conflict. Every lawyer knows this and regularly applies rules of “statutory interpretation.” There are no such rules in the Book of Order, but there are in Robert’s Rules of Order, which the Book of Order requires us to follow. When there are two rules, one specific and one general, the specific rule takes priority: “A general statement or rule is always of less authority than a specific statement or rule and yields to it.” Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised [RONR] (1990, 10th ed.), p. 571. The San Jose AI declares a general principle; the Birmingham AI declares a specific rule. Under this principle of interpretation, the Birmingham AI would take priority when it comes to the matter of compliance with G-6.0106b.

Moreover, when there are two interpretations of a rule, one of which renders an absurd outcome, that one must yield: When a provision of the bylaws is susceptible to two meanings, one of which conflicts with or renders absurd another bylaw provision, and the other meaning does not, the latter must be taken as the true meaning. RONR (1990, 10th ed.), p. 570. If the San Jose AI is found to take precedence over the Birmingham AI, then it would appear a presbytery could allow any departure from our confessional standards. For example, there would be no way to prohibit a governing body from ordaining someone refusing to repent of adultery or fornication. This is an absurd outcome that no one accepts as appropriate. Therefore the San Jose AI must yield to the Birmingham AI when G-6.0106b is at issue.

It appears that we are in the same place we were when the General Assembly adjourned in 2006. According to what the GA approved there in Birmingham, whether a governing body has complied with the Constitution and has considered the matter reasonably, responsibly, prayerfully, and deliberately is to be determined by judicial process. That culminated in the decision in Bush v. Presbytery of Pittsburgh, which the San Jose AI overturned. Because the Birmingham AI has been affirmed and retained, a PJC this time will need to decide whether the General Assembly has the power to authorize a violation of the Constitution.

ED KOSTER is the stated clerk of Detroit Presbytery (Mich.)